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Many observers of EU politics viewed 2005 as an annus horribilis, and 2006 has
brought little relief. Again and again, politicians and pundits of all stripes have
proclaimed the EU to be ‘in crisis’. Events great and small, from the French and
Dutch ‘No’ votes on the European Constitution, to the stalled budget talks, to
threats of Italy quitting the Euro, to the rising tide of protectionism, to alleged
strains on the EU’s absorption capacity, are routinely portrayed as threats to the
very survival of the Union. Many policymakers and scholars maintain that the
EU’s current institutional arrangements will not function in an EU of twenty-
ﬁve (or more) member states, and that without signiﬁcant reform, the EU’s
institutional machinery will grind to a halt. In June 2005, even Commission
President Barroso, whose very position would seem to call on him to serve as
Euroenthusiast-in-chief, declared that the EU was facing a ‘permanent crisis’
(BBC 2005).
Of course, predictions of the EU’s imminent demise are nothing new. In
March 1982, on the occasion of the twenty-ﬁfth anniversary of the Treaty of
Rome, The Economist led with a cartoon of a tombstone dedicated to the EEC.
The inscription included the dates—born March 25, 1957, moribund March 25,
1982—and an epitaph borrowed from Tacitus—Capax imperii nisi imperasset. (It
seemed capable of being a power, until it tried to be one.) Noting the weakness of
EEC institutions, growing disenchantment among European citizens, Greenland’s
secession and the looming threat of a UK secession, The Economist declared
the EEC to be in a near-death coma, at risk of collapsing into prolonged crisis
or total stagnation. Yet as we know today, the twenty-ﬁfth anniversary was not
the beginning of the end, but merely the end of the beginning. Three years later,
Jacques Delors became Commission President and launched the Single Market
program that breathed new life into the EEC and paved the way for the SEA and
Maastricht’s Treaty on EU. In the ensuing years, the EEC (later the EC and then
the EU) both widened—adding ﬁfteen member states—and deepened—extending
majority voting, enhancing the powers of the Parliament and the ECJ, gaining new
powers in existing areas of economic policymaking and extending its authority to
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As we approach the ﬁftieth anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, we again
confront the question of whether the EU is on its last legs. Are today’s dire
predictions any more credible than those made twenty-ﬁve years ago? Are the
EU’s institutional arrangements fragile? Are they in danger of collapsing under
the weight of enlargement, as today’s reports of ‘crisis’ suggest? Or instead, as
Andrew Moravcsik (2005b) has suggested, is the EU’s current ‘constitutional
settlement’ actually quite stable? In short, is today’s EU a fragile house of cards,
or is it built to last?
Unfortunately, too many scholars and commentators address these questions on
the basis of intuition and conjecture, rather than theory and systematic compara-
tiveanalysis.AsinsomanyareasofEUstudies,theEUistreatedasauniquecase,
which by deﬁnition cannot be compared to other political systems. This approach
isthewrongwayforward.Wedonotneedtoreinventthewheelinordertoidentify
the likely sources of instability in the EU and to assess the prospects for the
Union’ssurvival.AconceptualframeworkforanalyzingthedurabilityofEUinsti-
tutions lies at hand, in the literature on stability and instability in federal systems.
Some observers reject the comparison out of hand, maintaining that because
the EU lacks some crucial elements of statehood it cannot rightly be viewed
as a federal system. However, in recent years more and more EU scholars have
applied the lens of comparative federalism to the EU polity (see McKay 2001;
Nicolaïdis and Howse 2001; Börzel and Hosli 2003; Kelemen 2003, 2004; Ansell
and Di Palma 2004; Fabbrini 2005; Swenden 2004; Trechsel 2005; Schain and
Menon 2006; Thorlakson 2006). Building on the work of earlier pioneers of
the comparative federalism approach (such as Cappelletti, Seccombe, and Weiler
1986; Scharpf 1988; Sbragia 1992), these studies make it clear that the EU polity
can operate as and be analyzed as a federal system even if it lacks necessary
attributes of statehood. Indeed, the fact that the EU is not a state has not stopped
scholars of comparative federalism from examining it. Unencumbered by the
prejudice that the EU is sui generis and uncomparable, federalism scholars now
regularly treat the EU as a case in their comparative studies (Friedman-Goldstein
2001; Filippov, Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 2004; Rodden 2005; Bednar 2006). For
the purposes of the present analysis, the EU has the necessary minimal attributes
of a federal system1 and, crucially, the EU is riven with many of the same tensions
that afﬂict federal systems.
This chapter explores the durability of the EU, asking what comparative feder-
alism suggests about the prospects for the EU’s survival. Drawing on recent work
on self-enforcing federalism and on institutionalist insights into ‘self-reinforcing’
institutions, the chapter suggests that while the safeguards of EU federalism
remain weak, they are strengthening. The paper also explores the range of forms
of crisis that EU institutions might confront and suggests that the most threatening
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forms of crisis are highly implausible. As a result, the EU is, it would seem, built
to last. While EU institutions are likely to prove durable, they will by no means
remain static. The EU may have arrived at the broad outlines of a constitutional
settlement with regards to its basic institutional design as Moravcsik (2005b)
suggests; however, the allocation of authority between levels of government will
continue to shift incrementally, with the EU continuing to gain power at least in
the medium term.
The remainder of the chapter is divided into four sections. The ﬁrst section
explains why federalism is inherently, but not insurmountably, unstable. The
second section identiﬁes the safeguards of federalism that the literature on com-
parative federalism suggests are crucial for enabling federal systems to withstand
centrifugal and centripetal pressures. This section also assesses the extent to
which thesesafeguards can befound intheEU orappear tobeemerging. The third
section connects the ﬁrst two, exploring various scenarios in which the absence
of necessary federal safeguards might lead to some form of breakdown of EU
federalism and assessing their plausibility. The fourth section concludes.
Why Federalism is Unstable
Federalism is inherently unstable, and most federations fail (Lemco 1991). Feder-
alism can be deﬁned as an institutional arrangement in which (a) public authority
is divided between state governments and a central government, (b) each level
of government has some issues on which it makes ﬁnal decisions, and (c)a
high federal court adjudicates disputes concerning federalism (Kelemen 2003).
In some sense every federal system is a house divided. Each level of government
may have powerful incentives to undermine the federal system, and as a result,
all federal systems (the EU included) face ‘two fundamental dilemmas’ (Riker
1964; Bednar, Eskridge, and Ferejohn 2001; De Figueiredo and Weingast 2005).
The ﬁrst is federal overreach. Federal governments may undermine federalism by
aggrandizing their authority and usurping competences that the federal bargain
hadreservedforstates.Takentotheextreme,thiscouldtransformafederalsystem
into a de facto unitary system, in which state governments are mere administrative
appendages. The second dilemma is state shirking. Constituent states may shirk
on their commitments by refusing to comply with federal law, failing to contribute
required resources (i.e. taxes) to the center or infringing the rights of neighboring
states. Taken to the extreme, such behavior could lead to the breakdown of the
system, with state governments splitting apart to form entirely separate polities.
Unfortunately, institutions that help to resolve one of the dilemmas of federalism
often exacerbate the other.
One might attempt to wish away these dilemmas by simply including detailed
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comity’. However, such parchment barriers are inadequate (Swenden 2004;
Thorlakson 2006). Constitutions do not enforce themselves, and ultimately the
institutional arrangements that underpin federalism must provide state and fed-
eral political actors with incentives to abide by the rules of the federation. In
practice there is a continuous ‘ebb and ﬂow’ of authority between states and
the center (Donahue and Pollack 2001; Filippov, Ordeshook, and Shvetsova
2004). The danger is that these ebbs and ﬂows may quickly turn into tor-
rents and healthy tensions may explode into hazardous conﬂict. To be durable,
a federation must provide for a rigid enough division of authority to pre-
vent one level of government from usurping the authority of the other, while
remaining ﬂexible enough to allow for shifts in the division of authority in
response to economic, technological, sociocultural and political developments
(Nicolaïdis 2001).
Federations that fail to provide the necessary mix of rigidity and ﬂexibility can
collapse in one of two ways: implosion or explosion. With implosion, centripetal
forces undermine the autonomy of state governments and the federal system
transforms into a unitary state. Implosion is quite simply not a threat to the EU.
The notion that Brussels will usurp the authority of national governments and
create a unitary European superstate is the fear and rallying cry of Euroskeptics
across Europe. However, this is utterly implausible. Andrew Moravcsik is quite
right in declaring that, ‘the European superstate is an illusion’ (2005a: 370).
While the EU may continue to expand its authority in existing policy areas and
extend it to new ones, even the most extreme cases of deepening would rely on
a federal structure that preserved a central role for member state governments in
both policymaking and implementation. In other words, the federal balance in the
EU might in years to come tip further toward Brussels, but the EU could never
become a unitary state.2
The more plausible routes to collapse would involve various forms of explo-
sion. With explosion, centrifugal forces undermine the authority of the federal
center and pull apart member states, to the point where the federal system frag-
ments. In practice, explosion can take many forms, from extreme forms that
lead to the total collapse of the federal system to relatively minor forms of
fragmentation that loosen the ties of union but leave the ediﬁce intact. While it
may be easy to dismiss suggestions that the EU is on the verge of total collapse,
less catastrophic forms of ‘explosion’ are plausible. In order better to understand
the prospects for the EU’s durability, we must ﬁrst assess the strength of the
‘safeguards’ of federalism in the EU and then explore whether and how failures
of these safeguards might lead to some form of collapse.
2 Paradoxically, however, centralization might itself give rise to some form of explosion if,
for instance, the growing concentration of authority in Brussels leads one or more recalcitrant
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Federal Safeguards and Pitfalls
To understand whether the EU is likely to prove durable, we must ﬁrst clarify
what we think holds it together and next consider whether we think the sources
of the EU’s stability are strengthening or weakening over time. The literature on
federalism explores the conditions under which federal institutions are likely to
prove durable and identiﬁes a number of sources of stability in federations, often
termed federal safeguards. It is important to distinguish such ongoing federal
safeguards from the factors that provide the original motivation for the formation
of a federal system. An extensive literature on comparative federalism has also
examined the essential preconditions for the emergence of federalism (Deutsch
1957; Riker 1964; Wheare 1964) and some scholars have usefully applied this
literature to the EU (Riker 1996; McKay 1999; Eilstrup-San Giovanni 2006).
However, a federation can continue to thrive long after the initial conditions that
gave rise to it have passed. For the purposes of this chapter, it is more important to
explore the sources of the EU’s ongoing stability (or instability) than to query its
foundations. In this section, I review the leading sources of institutional stability
identiﬁed in the literature on comparative federalism—including structural safe-
guards, partisan safeguards, judicial safeguards, and sociocultural safeguards—
and assess both what role they play in sustaining EU federalism and whether they
are strengthening or weakening.
Federal safeguards are ﬁxed in the short term but are subject to change in
the long term. The EU federalism can only be durable in the long term if its
ongoing operations encourage behaviors that serve to strengthen its federal safe-
guards over time. In the language of institutional analysis, these dynamics are
captured by the notion of self-reinforcement. Self-reinforcement is an extension
of self-enforcement. A self-enforcing federal system is one structured such that
the center and the states have incentives to fulﬁll their obligations to the feder-
ation, given their expectations about one another’s behavior (de Figueiredo and
Weingast 2005). To be self-reinforcing, the system must encourage behaviors
that serve to expand the range of situations in which, or degree to which, it is
self-enforcing.3
Structural Safeguards
As Madison recognized in the Federalist Papers (No. 45), participation of state
governments in federal policymaking can provide an important structural safe-
guard against federal overreach (see also Wechsler 1954; Bednar, Eskridge, and
Ferejohn 2001). Giving representatives of state interests a voice in the federal
3 A self-undermining institution, by contrast, is one that is self-enforcing in the short term,
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legislative process puts them in a position to defend their prerogatives against self-
aggrandizing federal authorities. The most powerful means by which to safeguard
state interests structurally is to represent state governments in a powerful upper
legislative chamber. This is the approach taken, for instance, in the German
Bundesrat. Other structural safeguards may involve giving states a role in the
appointment of federal ofﬁcials, such as federal judges or bureaucrats, or simply
overrepresenting small states in the lower legislative chamber.
The EU has extremely powerful structural safeguards. Member state govern-
ments are directly represented in the EU’s ‘upper chamber’, the Council of Minis-
ters. Member state governments appoint the European Commission President and
the College of Commissioners (now subject to the approval of the EP). Member
state governments also appoint ECJ justices. Finally, member state governments
both monitor the implementation of EU policies by the Commission (through
the comitology system) and control the implementation of most policies at the
national level.
These powerful structural safeguards for state interests make Euroskeptic fears
of a European superstate utterly implausible. However, the structural safeguards
that limit federal overreach offer little protection against state shirking and the
explosion of the federation.4 To identify federal safeguards against explosion, we
must turn to the judiciary, political parties, and culture.
Judicial Safeguards
Federal courts are relied on both to police the division of authority between the
federal and state governments and to enforce state government compliance with
federal law. In other words, they are expected to prevent both implosion and
explosion. While federal high courts can and do police both forms of oppor-
tunism, empirical studies (Bzdera 1993; Bednar, Eskridge, and Ferejohn 2001)
have demonstrated that they are more effective in policing state cheating than
in restraining federal overreach. In policing the division of authority, federal
courts tend to be biased in the direction of the center, both because this is often
in their institutional self-interest (if doing so expands the scope of federal law)
and because the federal government will typically be in a stronger position to
apply political pressure on a federal court than will states. By contrast, when
policing state compliance, federal courts will have little to fear from backlash
in an isolated, recalcitrant state.
The EU has a powerful supreme court in the form of the ECJ, and all indications
suggest that the ECJ is growing more powerful. The strength of the ECJ is rooted
4 Structural safeguards may discourage fragmentation in an indirect sense: states that enjoy
effective ‘voice’ at the federal level may be less inclined to ‘exit’ the federation. A counterex-
ample illustrates the point: the weak structural safeguards of Canadian federalism were blamed
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in the EU’s fragmented institutional structure. As in other political systems, the
fragmentation of power between the political branches empowers the judiciary.
Divisions between the Council, the Parliament, and the Commission make it
difﬁcult for them to collaborate in reining in the ECJ. Therefore, the ECJ can
take an assertive stance in enforcing EU law against noncompliant member states
with little fear of backlash. Also, knowing that the ECJ and many national courts
are independent and assertive, EU lawmakers invite them to play a central role
in the policy process, encouraging the Commission and private parties to enforce
Community law in court (Kelemen 2004).
The history of EU legal integration has witnessed a steady tightening of EU
control over member state compliance. The development of the EU legal system
has beneﬁted from a dynamic in which member states encourage the EU to crack
down on states who seek to free ride by shirking on their legal obligations. Though
individual member states attempt to shirk in particular cases, the member states
acting collectively have encouraged the Commission to take a strict line with
lawbreakers. Thus the Commission has strengthened its enforcement activities
radically over the past twenty years and now makes frequent use of its power to
impose ﬁnancial penalties on member states that disregard EU rulings (Börzel
2001; Kelemen 2006).
Judicial safeguards against member state shirking have also been strengthened
by the development of decentralized enforcement of EU law by private parties
before national courts (Alter 2001). Decentralized enforcement is based on the
Article234preliminaryrulingprocedure,whichprovidesthatwheneveranational
court is hearing a case involving an unresolved question of EU law, that court
may refer the case to the ECJ to ask for the proper interpretation of the law.5
The procedure has encouraged the development of a dialogue between the ECJ
and national courts that set in motion a self-reinforcing process that steadily
strengthened the ECJ and EU law (Burley and Mattli 1993; Stone Sweet 2000;
Alter 2001).
By allowing national courts at all levels to refer cases to the ECJ, the procedure
enlists national courts as partners and generates a steady ﬂow of cases that has
enabled the ECJ to build up a body of case law that it can then refer to in justifying
subsequent judgments (Stone Sweet 2000). Furthermore, many judges see the
ECJ as a potential ally in battles with other branches of government, or higher
courts, domestically (Alter 2001). Many litigants use the procedure to leverage
EC law in the service of domestic policy battles (Alter and Vargas 2001). With
national courts applying EU law, governments that seek to resist European law
may be forced to disobey their own judiciaries; something they are loath to do.
The key to this process has been that the preliminary ruling procedure allows the
5 All national courts have the option of making such references, and ﬁnal courts of appeal are
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self-interested behaviors of the ECJ, national courts and private litigants to re-
inforce one another and continually to strengthen the EU legal system.
Partisan Safeguards
Party systems affect the incentives of state and federal politicians in several
ways that may work to sustain federal systems. Riker (1964) emphasized how
the decentralized structure of political parties (as in the USA) may play a vital
role in defending state interests and maintaining federalism in the face of great
centralizing pressures. Bermeo (2002) highlights the opposite dynamic, whereby
the incorporation of regional interests into national political parties can help
maintain federalism in systems threatened by centrifugal pressures. Turning to the
EU’s fragmented polity, the relevant question is whether the emerging European-
level party system has the potential to safeguard EU federalism against centrifugal
pressures?
A number of EU scholars have noted the growing power of party groups in the
EP (Kreppel 2002; Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006). While MEPs increasingly toe
the party line of their European party groups rather than voting along national
lines, for the time being these nascent party groupings remain too weak to
restrain behavior by national parties that might imperil the Union. In a recent
comparative federalism study, Thorlakson (2006) highlighted how the lack of
congruence between the national party systems in EU member states and the
emerging European party system makes it difﬁcult to build linkages between
national parties and party groups in the EP.6
While the European party groups do not yet provide an effective safeguard
against explosion, are there reasons to believe they will become more effective in
years to come? In their historical, comparative study of federations, Chhibber
and Kollman (2004) ﬁnd that party systems track the shifting allocation of
power in federations. Applying their insights to the EU, one would predict that
the increasing transfer of authority from the national to the EU level will be
accompanied by a strengthening of the role of European-level parties. Indeed,
Kreppel’s work (2002) suggests that the increasing legislative power has led to
increased centralization of party groups in the EP. From this perspective, Euro-
pean parties will not build Europe, but if European leaders build it, they will
6 The recent dispute between the British Conservative Party and the European People’s
Party both hints at how partisan safeguards of EU federalism might operate in the future and
demonstrates that they are not yet effective. When Conservative leader David Cameron pledged
to break away from the EPP and form a new coalition of Euroskeptic parties in the European
Parliament, he came under severe pressure from leading ﬁgures in the EPP (such as Angela
Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, and EPP Chairman Hans-Gert Pöttering) who threatened to isolate the
Conservatives should they pull out. However, Cameron brushed off these threats and went ahead
with his plan—recently announcing an agreement with the Czech Civic Democratic Party to
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come. The experience of other federal systems suggests that if the EU continues
to gain authority at anything like the pace it has in recent decades, we should
expect European-level parties to strengthen and gain inﬂuence over their national
counterparts.
Sociocultural Safeguards
The sociocultural approach to federal durability suggests that the stability of
federal institutions must be grounded in a shared sense of identity and political
culture of federalism. Most of the major scholars of federalism including Toc-
queville, Beer, Elazar, Stepan, and Riker have suggested, in one way or another,
that ‘a culture of federalism’ is vital for the survival of a federation. Conceptual-
izations of federal culture vary, with some scholars viewing it in terms of common
identity at the level of mass publics (Riker 1964; Elazar 1987; Stepan 2001),
others viewing it as a shared sense of commitment to the federal project among
political leaders (Franck 1968; Friedrich 1969; Elazar 1987) and others viewing
it more as a shared understanding—or focal point—concerning the division of
authority between states and the federation (de Figueiredo and Weingast 2005).
Without a healthy mixture of complementary identities, the routine inﬁghting
thatispartandparceloffederalpoliticsmaydegenerateintoconﬂictthatthreatens
the very survival of the polity (Franck 1968). Bednar (2006: 180) captures the
essence of the danger, explaining that ‘If citizens identify primarily with one
government then they may forgive or ignore (or even reward) opportunistic behav-
ior by it.’ Similarly, Stepan (2001: 326) emphasizes how the lack of a sufﬁcient
shared sense of identity can increase secessionist threats in fragmented polities.
If one level of government senses that it will not be punished by voters for openly
defying the other—and that it may in fact be rewarded—then it may have an
incentive to do so.
Turning to the EU, we must ask whether EU mass publics and elites have a
sense of common identity sufﬁcient to hold together the Union. There is sharp
disagreement among EU scholars as to what degree of common European identity
is necessary to support existing and future transfers of authority to the EU level,
and whether such common identity exists or is emerging. Let us begin with mass
publics. As in other federal polities, a sense of ‘Europeanness’ may be a complex
hybrid mixed with national and subnational identities (Choudhry 2001; Risse
2001; Nicolaïdis 2004). Can we say anything about the current level and trajectory
of this common identity? Eurobarometer surveys suggest that while slightly more
Europeans feel at least some sense of European identity mixed with their national
identities, there has been no long term increase in European identity over the
last thirty years (Duchesne and Frognier 1995). Graph 3.1, which presents some
recent Eurobarometer data (for 1992–2004), shows great stability in respondents’
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Question: In the near future do you see yourself as…?
Country: EU period: from April 1992 (EB37.0) to April 2004 (EB61).
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GRAPH 3.1. Hybrid identities.
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/waveoutp
Ultimately, whether the lack of a stronger common identity may prove trouble-
some depends on one question: just how much common identity is necessary to
underpin the EU? We cannot answer that question with any precision. However,
given that EU competences have expanded dramatically while levels of ‘European
identity’ have remained rather static, the likelihood that the EU’s power has grown
to the point where it exceeds the necessary basis of ‘identity’ safeguards must
necessarily have increased.
Turning to political elites, there is greater evidence of a long-term increase
in shared identities and a culture of federalism. Pioneering work on European
integrationbyHaas(1958)andFriedrich(1969)emphasizedhowthedevelopment
of shared identities and among national representatives at the EU level greased
the wheels of EU politics. More recently, a great number of studies of EU
policymaking in a wide variety of areas have found evidence that deliberative
policymaking in European fora has led national representatives to develop shared
norms and identities (Christensen, Jørgensen, and Wiener 1999; Checkel 2005b).03-Meunier-c03 OUP038-Meunier (Typeset by spi publisher services, Delhi) 61 of 66 January 23, 2007 14:25
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While some important studies have found that EU socialization pressures have
at best weak inﬂuence on preference change of elite decision-makers (Egeberg
1999; Hooghe 2005), we can still accept the qualiﬁed claim that at least under
some conditions, processes of socialization and deliberative policymaking can
lead to some forms of collective identity formation among elite decision-makers
engaged in European fora.
Though multinational federations can prove robust (e.g. Switzerland, Canada,
and, so far at least, Belgium), most have proven unsuccessful.7 Where federal
institutions are imposed on divided societies in which political elites and mass
publics lack adequate commitment to federalism, the system will be prone to
fragmentation. For the EU to resist centrifugal pressures over the long run, the
EU citizens and leaders may need to develop a stronger sense of common, albeit
hybrid, identity.
Breakdown Scenarios and Their Plausibility
While observers of EU affairs are quick to declare the EU to be in crisis, they
are typically far less clear as to what exactly a crisis of the EU might entail. Many
analyses of EU crisis seem to be premised on some version of the ‘bicycle theory’:
if the EU does not continue rolling forward it will fall over. Leaving aside for the
moment the fact that the bicycle theory lacks conceptual or empirical foundations,
it is still worth clarifying precisely what people mean with the idea that the EU
will ‘fall over’. What exactly would constitute a breakdown of EU federalism?
Would we recognize one if we saw it?
The formal renunciation of the Treaties by all member states and the vacating
of the ofﬁces in Brussels, Strasbourg, and Luxembourg would constitute an indis-
putable breakdown of the EU. But, short of such a dramatic and unlikely scen-
ario, it not self-evident precisely what sort of behaviors or institutional changes
should be viewed as indicators of the breakdown of EU federalism. This section
explores the range of variation on our dependent variable—the durability of EU
federalism—by highlighting the behavioral and institutional changes that could
be taken as indicators of the breakdown of EU federalism.
Dissolution
Formaldissolutionconstitutesthemostcompleteformofbreakupforafederation.
In this case, the federation dies when all of its constituent states agree to end their
union. Total dissolution is more likely in a federation with a small number of
states, in which they simply break up the federation and decide to go their separate
ways. Czechoslovakia’s velvet divorce and most recently the dissolution of Serbia
7 However, as Bermeo (2002) notes, all the failed federations of the 20th cent. have been ones
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and Montenegro illustrate this dynamic. As the number of states in the federation
increases, so does the likelihood that some subset of states will maintain existing
federal institutions, even if others have torn away from the federation. (We discuss
this outcome—limited secession—below.)
While formal dissolution would constitute the most complete form of breakup
of the EU, it is also the least likely. The current Treaty contains no provisions
allowing for its termination. Formally, if all the member states agreed to end the
EU, they would need to sign a new treaty detailing how and when to dissolve the
Union. This treaty, like any EU Treaty, would need to be ratiﬁed, in some cases
via a national referendum.
For the foreseeable future, it is difﬁcult to imagine any plausible scenario in
which the EU’s twenty-ﬁve member states would agree to dissolve the Union.
Sociocultural safeguards provide the strongest bulwark against dissolution. Even
with today’s modest levels of European identity, far more citizens across the EU
think EU membership is a good thing than thinking it is a bad thing. Eurobarom-
eter surveys over the past decade, supposedly a period of public disenchantment
with the Union, show that consistently approximately 50 percent of respondents
felt that EU membership was ‘a good thing’ while only approximately 13 percent
felt that it was ‘a bad thing’. Even in the most Euroskeptic countries, such as the
UK and Sweden, those who view EU membership is a good thing consistently
outnumber those who view it as a bad thing. (In 2006, 34 percent good vs. 28 per-
cent bad in the UK and 39 percent vs. 32 percent in Sweden. See Eurobarometer
64: 9–12.) In this climate of public opinion, it is difﬁcult to imagine politicians
aggresively pursuing moves to dissolve the EU, or to imagine publics supporting
such moves, either directly through referenda or indirectly through elections. If
the EU is someday formally dissolved, this would most likely only come at the
endpoint of a long series of partial breakdowns along the lines we outline below.
Limited Secession
The secession of one (or a small number) of member states would constitute a
limited form of explosion. Though rare, such voluntary secessions are not
unprecedented in federal systems. For instance, the Malaysian Federation con-
tinued (and continues) to operate after Singapore’s exit in 1965. The EU itself has
experienced secession. Though a full-ﬂedged member state has never seceded,
Greenland did secede from the Union in 1985 after achieving home rule from
Denmark. The EU’s draft constitutional treaty speciﬁcally establishes a mech-
anism for secession (Article I-60). Secession of a member state would clearly
signal a crisis of the Union, but it might not prove catastrophic. Indeed, while any
secession would be traumatic in the short run, one can imagine scenarios in which
the exit of a ‘preference outlier’ might eventually facilitate strengthening of the
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or the UK, left the Union, it might free up remaining members to pursue deeper
integration in areas that had been blocked.
The secession of a member state would signal a failure both of the Union’s
structuralsafeguards,partisansafeguards,andsocioculturalsafeguards.Secession
would be likely only where a member state felt that it could not adequately assert
its interests through the Council of Ministers or its inﬂuence in other EU fora. If
a member state found itself repeatedly outvoted in the Council on issues of core
national concern and was unable to block such decisions at the ECJ as violations
of subsidiarity or to mitigate their impact through the implementation process,
then one can imagine (however unlikely) scenarios in which a member state
would decide to quit the Union. Secession would also mark a failure of partisan
safeguards, as the European partisan counterparts of the government in question
would have surely tried to dissuade it from exiting. Finally, governments are only
likely to quit the Union if such a move enjoys the approval of their electorates,
which would itself indicate a clear failure of sociocultural safeguards.
Atrophy
Another form of breakdown would involve gradual atrophy. In this scenario, EU
institutions would continue to exist in more or less their current form, but would
be increasingly ignored by governments and interest groups, who might instead
turn their attention inward or to other supranational organizations. Over time,
the EU would cease to be a signiﬁcant forum for policymaking. This type of
atrophy would be unprecedented among truly federal systems. However, a number
of empires and international organizations provide useful illustrations of this
process. For instance, the Holy Roman Empire experienced a slow death through
atrophy. Formally, the Holy Roman Empire existed for nearly a millennium (843–
1805). In practice, the conﬂict between Protestants and Catholics in the sixteenth
century initiated a downward spiral from which the empire never recovered. Over
the next 200 years, the Holy Roman Empire devolved from a powerful, quasi-
federal arrangement into an empty shell. By the eighteenth century, Voltaire
famouslyquippedthattheHolyRomanEmpirewas‘neitherHoly,norRoman,nor
an Empire’. As Tim Garton Ash put it recently, might a future French philosopher,
surveying a weak, loose agglomeration spanning into Asia Minor, the Caucasus,
and to the edge of the Urals one day point out that the EU is ‘neither European
nor a Union’ (2006)?
Atrophy would result most likely from an erosion of the Union’s judicial
safeguards. Though the EU enjoys strong judicial safeguards, these cannot be
taken for granted. Defenders of national sovereignty and economic protectionists
regularly rail against the ECJ’s intrusions into national affairs. National politicians
of all varieties complain of ‘red tape’ emanating from Brussels, and EU policy-
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modes of governance’ such as the Open Method of Coordination (see Kelemen
and Idema 2006 for a critique of the OMC). Thus far, such methods have been
limited to peripheral areas of policymaking such as social policy. However, if
they spill over into core areas of EU competence, such as the Single Market and
the protection of individual rights, they could erode the EU’s judicial safeguards.
Were the EU to travel too far down this path, it might atrophy into something like
the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development)—a weak
international forum for the comparison of ‘best practices’ and the dissemination
of policy ideas—a far cry from the powerful EU we observe today.
Growth of Variable Geometry
The least obvious form of collapse would involve the growth of variable geometry.
Some degree of variable geometry constitutes no threat to the Union. Variable
geometry already exists in the EU, for instance with the variable memberships
in the Eurozone and Schengen, voluntary opt-outs in areas such as immigration
and asylum and plans for ‘enhanced cooperation’ in European Security and
Defense Policy (ESDP). Variable geometry exists in many federations, where it is
labeled ‘asymmetric federalism’, and is typically tailored to allow some states—
for instance those with particularly distinct cultural identities—greater autonomy
in policymaking.
Like other federations, the EU can operate effectively with some forms of
variable geometry. To date, variable geometry has served primarily to facilitate
deepening of European integration, allowing pioneers to move ahead and gener-
ating pressures to follow (Labeta 2005). However, taken to an extreme, variable
geometry could vitiate the Union (Leslie 2000). Some observers fear that the
exercise of opt-outs in sensitive areas—for instance a large state quitting the
Eurozone—could initiate a great unraveling, leading more states to opt out of
more policy areas. If voluntary opt-outs and opt-ins became the norm, the EU
might come to constitute more of an inchoate assemblage of overlapping clubs
than a formal federal-type organization with a legal order. As Schmitter (1996)
pointed out in his analysis of potential Euro futures, this outcome (which he
labeled Condominio) would be the most unprecedented path for the EU to take.
Greater reliance on variable geometry, if it is to emerge, is most likely to result
from an effort to steer clear of two less attractive outcomes: limited secession and
atrophy. In order to discourage skeptical member states from either seceding or
grinding EU operations to a halt, those who wish to push ahead will be tempted
simply to allow them to opt-out.
Civil War
A civil war, in which federal forces are deployed against a member state’s forces
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constitute a breakdown of the federal system. Federal systems are designed to
function as communities based on a shared rule of law. Where federal-state or
interstaterelationsbecomeviolent,thisruleoflawis,attheveryleast,temporarily
shaken. Such conﬂicts, by their very nature, signify a lack of common identity and
the breakdown in the sociocultural safeguards of federalism.
Ultimately, the impact of a ‘civil war’ on a federal system depends on the
outcomeoftheconﬂict.Ifstatebasedrebelsprevail,afederalsystemmaycollapse
or at least lose one or more states to secession. If, on the other hand, federal forces
prevail, the federal system may well emerge strengthened. Indeed, as Brian Taylor
(2006) has argued, in practice many federal systems regularly rely on some degree
of coercion. Similarly, Horowitz (1985) has argued that coercion may be crucial
to deterring secessionist threats and helping federations to succeed.
Is a European civil war plausible? While a war pitting the EU as a collective
actor against one of its member states is highly implausible, a variety of other
civil war scenarios are easier to imagine. For instance, looking some years into
the future, one could imagine a newly admitted member state in the Balkans
requesting EU assistance in suppressing an armed insurgency by a minority ethnic
group. They might in fact be eager for EU involvement, both to beneﬁt from
material assistance and to multilateralize the conﬂict so as to avoid potential
charges of human rights abuses by domestic troops. If the EU mounted a suc-
cessful ‘peacemaking’ and ‘peacekeeping’ operation, such a civil war might in
fact strengthen the Union. By contrast, any violent conﬂict between two member
states—for instance involving a border dispute or intervention by one member
state to protect its ethnic compatriots in a neighboring state—would prove far
more threatening to the Union. Fortunately, violent conﬂict between member
states is highly unlikely for the foreseeable future.
Conclusion
Rumors of the EU’s impending demise are greatly exaggerated. The EU is not in
a ‘permanent crisis’ as Barroso put it in June 2005, nor is it in a particularly ‘deep
crisis’ as Jean Claude Juncker put it days later. The EU is certainly not facing
an institutional crisis. The EU’s legislative machinery continued operating effect-
ively throughout 2005 and 2006, coping well with enlargement and continuing
to make policy on everything from telecommunications to ﬁnancial services, to
environmental and consumer protection. Recently, the member states have backed
the strengthening of EU powers in controversial areas such as counterterrorism
and policing (with the Data Retention Directive, the European Evidence Warrant
and proposals to give Europol new investigatory powers), and they have reached a
compromise on thecontroversial services directive. The ECJ has continued totake
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reach of EU law into sensitive areas including health care policy (Yvonne Watts,
Case C-372/04) and taxation (Marks & Spencer, Case C-446/03). In 2005, when
the Lega Nord, a partner in Berlusconi’s coalition government, raised the prospect
of Italy quitting the Eurozone, some observers worried about the currency’s
future. The Euro has taken such threats in its stride, maintaining its strength on
international currency markets.
In short, the EU still works, and it is extending into new policy arenas despite
its supposed crisis. Though the EU lacks signiﬁcant ﬁscal resources and has
developed only a weak common foreign and defense policy, it has amassed an
impressive array of powers at a rapid pace, with relatively few hiccups (such as
the empty chair crisis and the Danish No Vote on Maastricht) along the way.
From the long-term perspective, therefore, what is surprising is not that voters
in two member states rejected the constitutional treaty, but that the EU does not
experience more frequent clashes over its aims and direction.
Moravcsik suggests that we view the impasse over the EU constitution not as
a sign of crisis, but as a sign that the EU has arrived at a stable constitutional
equilibrium. He explains, ‘The EU’s current constitutional status quo appears
stable and normatively attractive. Beyond incremental changes in policy, it is
difﬁcult to imagine functional pressures, institutional pressures, or normative
concerns upsetting the stability of the basic constitutional equilibrium in Europe
today’ (2005a: 351). While one might agree with Moravcsik that today’s con-
stitutional status quo is normatively appealing, the notion that the EU is likely
to remain in some type of stasis belies the experience of other federal systems.
To be fair, Moravcsik does expect ‘incremental changes in policy’. However,
the experience of federal systems suggests that the cumulative effect of such
incremental changes may yield signiﬁcant changes in the division of authority
betweenmemberstatesandthefederalsystem.Evenwheretheyareself-enforcing
and durable, federal systems are inherently unstable. They never stand still: rather
the division of authority ebbs and ﬂows between the center and the states in
response to social, economic, and political change. To put it another way, if the EU
achieves any sort of stable endpoint, it will be the ﬁrst federal system in history to
do so.
If the EU is facing any crisis, it is an existential crisis, driven more by anxiety
andapanicked searchformeaning thanonanyobjective failingsofthesystem.As
with any existential crisis, so long as the victim does not commit suicide, they go
on living. Indeed, the collective dialogue concerning the objectives of the EU that
this crisis has sparked is surely good for a Union that has long failed to inspire
much interest or passion on the part of its citizens. Perhaps the greatest danger
in the current stalemate is that EU leaders seek to solve nonexistent problems,
by introducing potentially destabilizing reforms to institutions that are operating
quite well.